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
Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP70B00501R000100160006-2

18 July 1967

ES

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDS&T ✓
Chairman, COMIREX

The DDCI sends the attached, which has been approved by the Director, for your information. He would appreciate your informing him if you learn that the pressures for decontrol outside the Community are building up, so that the Director can raise the subject with Secretary McNamara.



EA/DDCI

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Copies of Attachment to:

DDS&T

Chairman, COMIREX



ADDI

CIA/TCO



USIB/S

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14 July 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Sanitization and Decontrol of Satellite
Photography

1. In response to your "Now what?" question appended to the DIA letter conveying SecDef views on subject, I suggest that, for the moment, we agree with the course of action indicated in the DIA memo. That is, do what we can via the sanitization process. COMIREX is at present proceeding with revisions to the Sanitization Manual which will accomplish many of the substantive objectives contemplated.

2. I do not believe we should be satisfied with the solution indicated above. There are too many and too potent pressures for decontrol. In this connection I think it is important not to confuse decontrol with declassification. Declassification is not contemplated although I think in Mr. McNamara's mind decontrol and declassification amount to the same thing. I think it is specious to argue that the Secret classification is held in so little regard that it amounts to declassification. Insofar as our highest level people are concerned, it makes little difference what the classification and control practices are for a given item if they want to release it. Therefore, I think the Secret classification provides adequate protection for the areas of more or less controllable vulnerability and I think we will eventually have to come to it.

3. In many ways this situation is analagous to the earlier days of control over COMINT products when we argued that down-grading any of it would jeopardize all of it. We eventually came to see that this was not so and as a result have achieved a considerably greater degree of flexibility in use of the material without any jeopardy at all to any of the really sensitive sources which we have still been able to control. We can do the same thing with photography and I am sure we will have to before very long.

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TCS 9586-67

#2

4. Consequently, I recommend that we seize any opportunities as they occur to re-open this issue but not press it now until and unless you should chance upon a congenial opportunity to discuss the matter with McNamara. I think you or I could convince Nitze right now if we wanted to, but I don't think he could convince McNamara until the two have worked closely together for awhile. Thus, that route may offer an opportunity for the future if we wish to pursue it. On balance, though, I think that the "congenial opportunity" may have to depend upon pressures put upon McNamara from activities outside the Intelligence Community. When we sense this, we should try again. Meanwhile, I suggest we let the intelligence bureaucracy continue on its present slow and steady course.



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Rufus Taylor
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Deputy Director

Attachment - DIA TCS 250694-67 cys. 1 and 2
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